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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rules 24, 26 and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Plaintiff/Appellant Deer Crest Associates I, L.C. ("Deer Crest") submits its Reply 
Brief. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. Deer Crest has no obligation to marshal the facts. 
On page 8 of its Brief, Defendant/Appellee Silver Creek Development 
Group LLC ("Silver Creek") sets forth the text of the District Court's Conclusions 
of Law. Conclusion of Law No. 2, according to Silver Creek, reads in part as 
follows: 
"That Deer Crest's execution of the Agreement constituted a 
knowing and intentional waiver of any right to a judicial remedy 
under Article I, §§7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution." 
In Footnote 1 on the same page, Silver Creek notes that Deer Crest has 
challenged Conclusion of Law No. 2. Silver Creek then argues that this 
Conclusion of Law was actually a finding of fact; that Deer Crest should have 
figured this out; that Deer Crest had an obligation to marshal the evidence in 
support of this "finding of fact"; that Deer Crest failed to marshal the evidence; 
and therefore, Deer Crest is precluded from challenging this "finding of fact". 
Silver Creek's argument borders on the fatuous. To begin with, Silver 
Creek misquoted the first sentence of Conclusion of Law No. 2. It actually reads: 
"The Court concludes as a matter of law that Deer Crest's 
execution of the Agreement constituted a knowing and intentional 
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waiver of any right to a judicial remedy under Article I, §§7 and 11 
of the Utah Constitution." [Emphasis supplied] 
ROA 196. 
The phrase "The Court concludes as a matter of law" establishes beyond 
doubt that Conclusion of Law No. 2 was a conclusion of law., not a finding of fact. 
The absence of this phrase, as Silver Creek suggests in its statement of Conclusion 
of Law No. 2, might arguably raise some uncertainty as to whether this was truly a 
conclusion of law or a finding of fact, but the presence of this phrase eliminates 
f i a t ui'iCCii: ' . i t ' . 
Although the District Court's order containing this Conclusion of Law does 
not contain an express statement to the effect that the order was prepared by Silver 
Creek's counsel, it is clear from the document itself that it was in fact prepared by 
Silver Creek's counsel. The name and address of Silver Creek's counsel appears in 
the upper left-hand portion of the first page of the order. The caption of the 
pleading contains in brackets the word "PROPOSED"; and the last page of the 
order contains a signature line for Deer Crest's counsel to sign to indicate that the 
order is approved as to form. One might reasonably suppose that Silver Creek, 
having drafted the pleading in the first place, would not find it difficult to provide 
an accurate quotation of Conclusion of Law No. 2. 
Even if Conclusion of Law No. 2 were a finding of fact, there is no 
"evidence" to marshal. The District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
There were no affidavits submitted by either party. The parties did not stipulate to 
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any facts. All that the District Court had to consider at oral argument of Deer 
Crest's motion to lift the stay, other than memoranda filed by the parties' 
attorneys, was the agreement between the parties and the arbitrator's ruling on 
Silver Creek's motion to dismiss. The only language in the agreement arguably 
bearing on this issue is Section 19.1, which is simply the arbitration clause that the 
District Court was attempting to construe. The Arbitrator's Ruling is absolutely 
silent on this issue. There is simply no evidence for Deer Crest to marshal in 
support of such a "finding of fact". 
Finally, Silver Creek should not be permitted to argue that Deer Crest's 
right to challenge Conclusion of Law No. 2 has been lost because Silver Creek's 
attorneys, in drafting the order, mistakenly designated it a conclusion of law rather 
than a finding of fact. 
2. Deer Crest does not seek to set aside the Arbitrator's decision. 
Silver Creek argues on page 12 of its Brief that Deer Crest seeks to "set 
aside the arbitration decision because it disagrees with the outcome." This is a 
common theme that Silver Creek repeats throughout its Brief.1 Repetition however 
does not make it true. Deer Crest does not seek to set aside the arbitration decision 
nor does it disagree with the outcome. 
Here is what the Arbitrator decided: 
1
 "A party is not free to simply ask that the court start over again and re-litigate the 
matter just because the party disagrees with the arbitration decision." Appellee's 
Brief, page 13, footnote 4; "As noted above, in this case appellant has not raised 
below nor asserted in this appeal any ground to vacate the award under § 78B-11-
124." Appellee's Brief, page 19; 
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"Based on the foregoing authority, the Arbitrator is compelled to 
conclude that Deer Crest waived its right to arbitration under the 
Contract Documents by failing to file its demand within the time set 
forth in the Contract Documents. Therefore, the AAA lacks further 
jurisdiction to resolve this matter under the Contract Documents." 
ROA 87. 
Deer Crest agrees that it did not file its demand for arbitration within the 30 
day time period required by Section 19.1; it also agrees that It therefore waived its 
right to arbitration under the Contract Documents; and finally it agrees that the 
American Arbitration Association lacks jurisdiction to reso?ve the m3t:er under the 
contract Documents. 
Deer Crest did not and is not seeking to set aside the Arbitrator's decision. 
The Arbitrator determined that he did not have jurisdiction to decide Deer Crest's 
claims against Silver Creek. In the District Court and on this appeal, Deer Crest is 
simply asking for an opportunity to be heard in the District Court, which does 
have jurisdiction to hear Deer Crest's claims against Silver Creek. 
3. The Arbitrator's decision was not an "Arbitration Award". 
Silver Creek makes a fundamental error in characterizing the Arbitrator's 
decision dismissing the arbitration for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as an 
"arbitration award" that can only be collaterally attacked through a motion to 
vacate the award under Utah Code §78B-11-124. This error permeates and 
undermines each of Silver Creek's arguments. The Arbitrator's decision, however, 
was neither an arbitration award nor an adjudication on the merits and therefore 
4 
does not work to preclude further litigation of Deer Crest's claims against Silver 
Creek. 
A review of the Arbitrator's decision shows that it is not an "arbitration 
award". The decision is entitled "Ruling on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss". 
The word "award" does not appear in the title; indeed, the word "award" cannot 
be found anywhere in the Arbitrator's decision. 
The Arbitrator does not identify either party as the prevailing party. There 
is no award of attorney's fees which Section 19.1 mandates be awarded to the 
prevailing party in arbitration. 
Utah recognizes that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not 
an adjudication on the merits and that such a dismissal is without prejudice to a 
party's right to continue to litigate its claims in a proper forum. Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, provides explicitly that an involuntary 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not "an adjudication on the 
merits" and does not bar another action by the same plaintiff on the same claims. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
The District Court's order of dismissal implicitly recognizes that the 
Arbitrator's decision was not an "award". Under Utah's Uniform Arbitration Act, 
an arbitration award can only be confirmed, modified or vacated. See, Utah Code 
§78B-11-123, §78B-11-124 and §78B-11-125. The District Court did none those 
things. It simply dismissed Deer Crest's complaint with prejudice. 
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An arbitration award is something that an arbitrator grants to a party, after 
evaluating the evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing. The award resolves 
the issues presented to the arbitrator and is binding and enforceable in court as a 
judgment. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663, 673 (Utah 2002); Utah Code 
§78B-11-126. Here, there was no evidentiary hearing; the Arbitrator did not 
resolve Deer Crest's claims against Silver Creek; and he did not render a decision 
that could be enforced as a judgment. Instead, he ruled that because he did not 
have jurisdiction over die dispute, he could not do any of these things. 
ridiniy, me Aroitralur s decision in this case was not an "award" within the 
meaning of §78B-11-120 of Utah's Uniform Arbitration Act. An arbitrator without 
jurisdiction can no more enter an award than a court without subject matter 
jurisdiction can enter a judgment. Like a court without subject matter jurisdiction, 
an arbitrator without jurisdiction can only dismiss the arbitration. 
The only determination that the Arbitrator made was that the failure to file 
a demand for arbitration within 30 days after a claim has arisen resulted in a 
waiver of the right to have that claim arbitrated. The Arbitrator did not determine, 
although he certainly could have, that the failure to file a demand for arbitration 
within a 30 day period after the claim had arisen resulted in the extinguishment 
that claim. The District Court's order dismissing Deer Crest's complaint on the 
ground that Deer Crest had not filed a timely demand for arbitration was in effect 
a reversal of the Arbitrator's decision. Silver Creek obviously wanted a dismissal 
of Deer Crest's claims on the merits. It did not get that front the Arbitrator so, it 
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decided tha.t it would "simply ask that the court start over again and re-litigate the 
matter" because Silver Creek disagreed with the arbitration decision. The District 
Court second guessed the Arbitrator's decision and ignored all of the authority that 
Silver Creek now cites in its Brief for the proposition that the issues determined in 
a valid arbitration proceeding cannot be re-litigated by the parties in district court. 
4- Peer Crest has not argued that Section 19.1 is ambiguous. 
On page 20 of its Brief, Silver Creek argues that Deer Crest should not be 
permitted to argue that the Agreement was ambiguous because Deer Crest did not 
present this argument to the District Court nor did it raise the issue in its 
Docketing Statement. Silver Creek is correct that Deer Crest did not argue to the 
District Court that the Agreement was ambiguous and did not include that issue 
within its Docketing Statement. But Deer Crest never raised this issue in its 
Opening Brief. Indeed, Deer Crest has never taken a position that Section 19.1 was 
ambiguous; rather, it is Deer Crest's position that Section 19.1 cannot be 
reasonably understood to be a 30 day statute of limitations; and it cannot be 
bootstrapped into a 30 day statute of limitations by admitting parole evidence to 
resolve an ambiguity. 
The
 oniy mention of "ambiguities" in Deer Crest's Opening Brief is found 
on page I5 where the following sentence appears: "No parole evidence was 
offered by either party to explain ambiguities in the Agreement." That is a simple 
statement c>f fact and is not an argument that the Agreement was ambiguous in a 
way that relates to the issues on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal of Deer Crest's 
complaint and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to allow 
Deer Crest to litigate its claims against Silver Creek. 
Dated this 28th day of July 2009. 
ERICG. EASTERLY (8981) 
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